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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COUNTY ROAD. The defendant and plaintiff owned
ranches which were separated by a strip of land. Each party
had its own fence running along the disputed strip and the
strip itself was used as a dirt road for access by other
neighbors and hunters to land at the end of the strip. The
defendant decided to develop a portion of the land as a
residential subdivision and petitioned the county to place a
paved road on the strip. The defendant discovered that a
petition to designate the strip as a road had been granted in
1921; however, the petition was not properly recorded and
no one else had any actual knowledge of the road
designation, either among the previous owners, neighbors
or the parties. The court held that the lack of notice
prevented enforcing the road designation against the
plaintiffs who held title to the strip. The defendants also
argued that the use of the road by neighbors and hunters
established the strip as a public road by adverse possession.
The court found that most of the public use of the strip was
by permission; therefore, no public road was established by
such use. Littlefield v. Bamberger, 32 P.3d 615 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2001).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors, husband and wife, owned
two neighboring parcels of rural real estate which were
claimed as a rural homestead exemption under Tex. Prop.
Code § 41.002. One parcel was 59 acres and contained the
debtors’ residence and the other 26 acres were used as a
mobile home park. The court adopted a blended test which
first examined the property under the factors in the statute
to determine whether the property was rural or urban. If the
property met the statutory definition of rural, the property
qualified for the rural homestead exemption. If the property
was classified as urban under the statutory test, the nature
of the property was examined under the traditional judicial
factors. The court held that both parcels met the statutory
rural test because the parcels were not within a municipal
boundary and were not served by municipal utility services.
However, the court held that the 26 acres did not qualify as
residential because the property was used as a business.
Therefore, the court allowed the exemption for the 59 acre
parcel but not for the 26 acre parcel. In re Perry, 267 B.R.
759 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ELIGIBILITY. The debtor was a corporation wholly-
owned by one person. The debtor’s business was the
raising, boarding and training of horses on rural property
zoned for farming use. The court noted that the horse
operation was subject to the same risks inherent in any farm
operation and held that the debtor qualified for Chapter 12.
In re Showtime Farms, Inc., 267 B.R. 541 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 2000).
PLAN . The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan modified a secured
loan from a creditor by reducing the interest rate from 10
percent to 9.25 percent and changing the loan term from
nine years to a 30-year amortization rate with a ten-year
balloon payment. The creditor objected to the modification
of the loan as not providing the creditor with the full value
of the loan over the plan period. The court held that the
modification of the loan term would not of itself prevent
confirmation of the plan. However, the court held that the
debtor failed to demonstrate that the 9.25 percent interest
rate was the market rate of interest for this type of loan;
therefore, the modification of the loan interest rate
prevented confirmation of the plan. The court used a two-
part test to determine the sufficiency of the interest rate: (1)
there is a rebuttable presumption that the loan contract rate
was appropriate and (2) the debtor had the burden to prove
that the plan payment interest rate was the market rate for
similar loans. In re Showtime Farms, Inc., 267 B.R. 541
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor had filed income tax returns
for 1993 and 1994 but had altered lines 23 and 24 and
replaced them with “Non-taxable Compensation” and had
altered the jurat language at the end of the form. The debtor
filed for Chapter 7 more than three years later and sought to
have the taxes declared dischargeable under Section 523.
Th  court held that the altered forms were insufficient to
qualify as filed returns under Section 523 because the
alterations did not represent an honest and reasonable
attempt to satisfy the filing requirements. In re
Brumbaugh, 267 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001).
SETOFF. The IRS had filed an unsecured priority claim
and an unsecured non-priority claim for past taxes owed by
the Chapter 13 debtor. The debtor filed  a tax return for
1999 which claimed a refund. The IRS set off the refund
against the  non-priority tax claim and the debtor claimed
that the refund should have been set off against the priority
tax claim first. The debtor argued that allowing the IRS to
choose which claim would be set off by the refund was
unfair to other unsecured non-priority creditors. The court
held that the setoff was proper and allowable under Section
553. In re Crawford, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,769 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2001).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PACA. The Chapter 13 debtor and spouse owned a
corporation which was a dealer under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) which purchased
produce from a producer but failed to make payment for the
produce. The debtor had personally guaranteed the
corporation’s payment for the produce. The producer filed a
claim in the bankruptcy case and sought priority for the
claim under the PACA trust provisions. The producer
argued that the debtor should be held liable under the
PACA trust provisions because the debtor controlled the
corporation and personally guaranteed payment. The court
noted that there was no claim made that the debtor had
received any of the proceeds of the sale of the produce. The
court held that the debtor could not be held liable under the
PACA trust provisions because the debtor was only
secondarily liable for payment for the produce and had not
received any of the proceeds from the sale of the produce.
In re Ozcelik, 267 B.R. 485 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CLAIMS . On the date of the decedent’s death, the
decedent was involved in a suit filed by the lessor of an oil
lease for excess royalty payments made to the decedent.
The lessor received some favorable rulings soon after the
decedent’s death but settled for a smaller sum than was
originally sought from the decedent 15 months after the
decedent’s death. The decedent’s estate valued the law suit
claim as of the decedent’s death, based on the money
judgment sought by the lessor. The IRS argued that the
claim was to be valued at the amount that the estate
eventually paid or that the estate had discharge of
indebtedness income when the settlement was reached to
the extent the actual amount paid was less than the claim
allowed for estate tax purposes. The court held that the
value of the claim was to be determined as of the date of
death, based on the information available at that time. The
court also held that the estate did not recognize discharge of
indebtedness income when it settled for an amount less than
the claim’s value as of the date of death. On remand, the
Tax Court noted that the appellate court had rejected
valuing the law suit at the time of death at the full amount
sought by the lessor. The Tax Court also noted that the
estate failed to provide any evidence of the value of the
lawsuit as of the date of death. The Tax Court held that the
IRS valuation was correct, based on all the evidence
presented. Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-
303, on rem. from, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999) rev’g,
108 T.C. 412 (1997).
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION . In a
Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS discussed several
issues involving the I.R.C. § 2057(i)(3)(P) lien created by
the FOBD election. The IRS stated that the lien should
identify the real property involved in the election and not
rely on identifying personal property such as stock in
corporation which owns the property. The IRS also stated
that Form 668H, Notice of Federal Estate Tax Lien, should
be altered to include notification of the I.R.C. §
2057(i)(3)(P) lien. The IRS suggested that escrow
agreem nts could be used to include personal property,
such as corporation stock in the lien. Finally, the IRS stated
that third parties with interests in FOBD property must also
cons nt to the FOBD recapture provisions. See also Harl,
“Li ns for the Family-Owned Business Deduction,” 12
Agric. L. Dig. 121 (2001). CCA Ltr. Rul. 200148052, Oct.
16, 2001.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent’s entire estate
passed to a marital trust for the surviving spouse, resulting
in no estate tax. After the estate tax return was filed, the
IRS assessed additional taxes and interest for a pre-death
gift made by the decedent to the surviving spouse. That
assessment was affirmed by the courts, but the estate sought
to offset the tax and interest by estate administrative
expenses which were in excess of the expenses claimed on
the estate tax return. Some of the administrative expenses
were charged to estate income and some to estate principal.
The IRS argued that the administrative expenses would
have to decrease the marital deduction because the expenses
decreased the income and principal received by the
surviving spouse. The court held that the extra
admi istrative expenses charged to estate income did not
iminish the marital deduction because the expenses did not
constitute a material limitation on the surviving spouse’s
bequest. The court also held that the extra administrative
expenses charged to estate principal reduced the marital
d duction, although this did not affect the overall estate tax
becaus  the entire estate passed to the surviving spouse.
T e court held that the expense for the interest on the tax
deficiency did not reduce the marital deduction. Brown v.
Unit d States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 60,424 (C.D.
C lif. 2001).
TRUSTS. The decedents, husband and wife, had
est blished an irrevocable trust funded with a life insurance
policy n both decedents. The trust provided that the
dec dents’ child was to be trustee and that upon the death
of the second to die, the proceeds of the policy were to be
paid to the trust. The trustee had the discretion to pay any
inheritance, estate or income tax resulting from the
taxpay rs’ deaths. The wife was the second to die and the
insurance proceeds were not used by the trustee to pay any
taxes r sulting from the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled
that the insurance proceeds were not included in the wife’s
estate b cause the trustee was not obligated to pay the
tax s. Ltr. Rul. 200147039, Aug. 21, 2001.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer owned an interest in several
companies. One construction company loaned money to a
real estate partnership. The promissory note stated an
interest rate but no due date. The note was listed in several
audits and reports to the FmHA (now FSA), The
construction company terminated without paying the loan
and the partnership claimed a bad debt deduction. The
taxpayer argued that the promissory note, audits and FmHA
reports proved the bona fide debt. The court held that the
taxpayer failed to prove that the loan was a bona fide debt.
The court discounted the value of the audits and reports
because the information was supplied by the taxpayer.
Fedewa v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-176.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was self-
employed as a computer engineer and claimed three
payments as business expenses. However, the taxpayer
provided no corroborating evidence of the business purpose
of the expenses and the court denied the deduction as
business expenses. The appellate court affirmed in a
decision designated as not for publication. Simpson v.
Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,750 (6th
Cir. 2001), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-274.
CHARITIES . Several charities have made payments to
individuals by reason of the death, injury or wounding of an
individual incurred as a result of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. The IRS has announced that it will treat
such payments made by a charity to individuals and their
families as related to the charity's exempt purpose provided
that the payments are made in good faith using objective
standards. The IRS noted that legislation in this area is
pending in Congress. Notice 2001-78, I.R.B. 2001-50.
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayers owned an S
corporation with a third party. The third party retired and
sold the stock back to the corporation. The stock sales
agreement did not allocate any portion of the sales price to
a covenant not to compete by the third party and no
covenant not to compete was included in the sales
agreement. However, the taxpayers claimed amortization
deductions for the alleged value of a covenant not to
compete. The Tax Court held that no portion of the stock
sales price could be allocated to a covenant not to compete
because the parties to the sale did not allocate, or intend to
allocate, any portion of the sales price to such a covenant.
The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not
for publication. Miner v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,752 (9th Cir. 2001).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in November
2001, the weighted average is 5.74 percent with the
permissible range of 5.17 to 6.03 percent (90 to 106 percent
permissible range) and 5.17 to 6.32 percent (90 to 110
percent permissible range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
2001-71, I.R.B. 2001-__.
The IRS has issued tables of covered compensation under
I.R.C. § 401(l)(5)(E) for the 2002 plan year. Rev. Rul.
2001-55, I.R.B. 2001-47, 497.
The taxpayer was a retired teacher. During employment
as a teacher, the taxpayer made after-tax contributions to a
pension plan. These contributions formed a tax basis in the
pension plan which was allocated ratably to each year
distributions were made after the taxpayer’s retirement. The
taxpayer argued that the basis from these contributions
should be increased to reflect the amount of inflation which
occurred after the contributions were made. The court held
that the taxpayer’s basis in the pension plan could not be
increased for inflation because there was no authority in the
statute or regulations for increasing basis because of
inflati n. The appellate court affirmed in a decision
designated as not for publication. Nordtvedt v. Comm’r,
2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,772 (9th Cir. 2001),
aff’g, 116 T.C. 165 (2001).
PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY . The taxpayer
was a calendar year basis personal holding company. In
September 1997, the taxpayer declared a consent dividend
to its shareholders under I.R.C. § 565. All the shareholders
signed the proper consent Form 972. The taxpayer filed
these consents and Form 973 (Corporate Claim for
Deduction for Consent Dividends) with its Form 1120 in
September 1997, pursuant to an extension to file. Some of
the axpayer's shareholders were foreign persons. The
taxpayer included a payment of 30 percent of the amount of
the consent dividends attributable to the foreign
shareholders with its Form 1120. Because the taxpayer had
lready filed its 1996 Form 1042, it filed an amended return
to eport the consent dividends in September 1997.  The
IRS assessed the taxpayer interest on the tax attributable to
the con ent dividends from the due date of the Form 1120,
March 15, 1997, to the date the tax was paid in September
1997. The IRS ruled that the interest was assessed properly
because, although the taxpayer had until the extended filing
date to file the consent forms, the tax had to be paid by the
original due date for Form 1120. Ltr. Rul. 200147005,
June 15, 2001.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 2001
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 2.48 2.46 2.45 2.45
110 percent AFR 2.73 2.71 2.70 2.69
120 percent AFR 2.97 2.95 2.94 2.93
Mid-term
AFR 3.97 3.93 3.91 3.90
110 percent AFR 4.37 4.32 4.30 4.28
120 percent AFR 4.78 4.72 4.69 4.67
Long-term
AFR 5.05 4.99 4.96 4.94
110 percent AFR 5.57 5.49 5.45 5.43
120 percent AFR 6.08 5.99 5.95 5.92
Rev. Rul. 2001-58, I.R.B. 2001-50.
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
FRONT LOADER. The plaintiff had owned a tractor
and front-end loader for over 19 years. The plaintiff had
altered the front-end loader by soldering on two brackets to
hold a bale fork. The plaintiff was injured while
transporting a large round hay bale when the loader lifted
too high and caused the hay bale to roll back onto the
plaintiff in the tractor. The tractor did not have a roll over
protection system. The accident was apparently caused by a
defective valve on the front-end loader which allowed the
loader to rise without control. The plaintiff filed suit against
the tractor and front-end loader manufacturer under the
Kansas Product Liability Act, Kan. Stat. §§ 60-3301 et seq.,
for negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty and
included a claim for failure to warn. The defendant argued
that its liability was extinguished by Kan. Stat. § 60-
3302(a) because the tractor and front-end loader were past
their useful safe lives. The statute provided a presumption
that equipment over 10-years old was past its useful safe
life. The plaintiff presented evidence of the equipment’s
condition and expert testimony that the tractor and front-
end loader were not past their useful safe lives. The court
held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of
the tractor and front-end loader’s condition to make their
useful safe life a jury question. On the failure to warn
claim, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had sufficient
personal knowledge of the dangers involved in carrying
large round hay bales to relieve the defendant of any duty to
warn. The defendant also argued that the modifications to
the front-end loader were sufficient to relieve the defendant
of any strict liability. The court noted that, without the
modification by the plaintiff, the front-end loader would not
have been able to transport large round hay bales and the
accident would not have happened. Therefore, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in strict liability because of
substantial modification of the front-end loader. Hiner v.
Deere & Co., 161 F. Supp.2d 1279 (D. Kan. 2001).
PROPERTY
CONVERSION. The plaintiffs were co-owners of
timberland with the defendant. The defendant had
purchased a two-thirds interest in the timber held by
siblings of the plaintiffs and had cut the timber or
contracted with others to cut the timber without first
obtaining permission from the plaintiffs. The defendant
paid the plaintiffs their share of the value of the timber;
however, the plaintiffs sued for conversion. The jury agreed
with the plaintiffs’ valuation of the timber and awarded the
plaintiffs the difference between what the defendant paid
them and one-third of the true value of the timber, plus the
cost of restoration. The defendant argued that, as co-owner,
the defendant had the right to harvest the timber. The court
upheld the jury verdict. Dillard v. Wade, 45 S.W.3d 848
(Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtor had granted a security interest in
farm equipment and after-acquired property to a bank in
1985. In 1998, the debtor borrowed money from a creditor
to purchase more farm equipment and granted a purchase-
money security interest (PMSI) in that equipment to the
creditor. The PMSI also contained a future advances clause
to cover any additional loans. In 1999, the debtor borrowed
additi al funds from the creditor and a new promissory
note was executed which referred back to the original loan
and security interest. The additional funds were used to
purchase more farm equipment. The loan amount was
increased again in 2000 under the same terms. The PMSI
creditor argued that its security interest had priority over the
b nk’s security interest because of operation of Iowa Code
554.9107(b) which provided superpriority to PMSIs. The
court held that the “dual status” doctrine applied to the
PMSI to allow superpriority status to the security interest to
the extent the loan proceeds were attributable to the
purchased equipment. To the extent the loan proceeds were
used for other purposes, no superpriority was allowed. The
court also held that the payments made by the debtor on the
loan w uld be applied first to the first equipment purchases
and then to the non-equipment purchase use of the loan
proceeds, essentially a first-in first-out method.  The court
declined to make a final determination because the debtor
and creditor had not provided sufficient evidence of the
loan’s history to determine the extent of funds attributable
to the purchase of the farm equipment. In re McAllister,
267 B.R. 614 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001).
VOLUME 12 INDEX
Adverse Possession
Fence 26
Paying taxes 130
Animals
Criminal neglect 138
Dogs 50
Equine Immunity Statute 34
Horses 58
Search and Seizure 130
Bankruptcy
General
Abandoned property 35
Administrative claims 66
Administrative claims 74
Avoidable liens 146
Claims 131
Conversion 43
Discharge 35, 123
Estate property 115, 123
Executory contracts 75
Exemptions
Additional child tax credit  106, 123,
139
Homestead 35, 75, 85, 131, 146, 178
Motor vehicle 11
